Developments in the Gulf since the beginning of this year have raised fundamental questions about the security of the region in general and Qatar in particular. How can Qatar and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states become effective, independent military powers that do not rely on external security guarantees to ensure their safety?
The question for Qatar is how it can build, over the next five years, a national defence capability that would enable it to protect the state and its vital interests even in the absence of Gulf or regional support, or if the United States provides only limited assistance. The aim is to explore whether Qatar can achieve what might be described as defence autonomy, rather than isolation. In other words, Qatar should remain open to alliances and partnerships without making its security dependent on the decisions of another state.
Qatar is a small country in terms of geography and population, but it enjoys numerous advantages. It has highly valuable critical infrastructure, a sensitive geographical location and an economy that depends heavily on the uninterrupted flow of energy exports, trade and shipping to almost every part of the world. At the same time, it possesses substantial financial resources, extensive international relationships, a major military base hosting US forces, advanced air defence capabilities and a network of political relationships that give it influence beyond its physical size.
These advantages, however, do not amount to “strategic autonomy”. In a major crisis such as the one the region has been experiencing for several months, Qatar’s protection remains heavily dependent on the US. Nor does reliance on the collective capabilities of the GCC provide sufficient assurance that its member states would be able, or willing, to take risks in defence of another member.
Against this backdrop, Qatar’s policy objective over the next five years should be to design and build an independent national strategy based on the capacity to prevent threats, withstand attacks and maintain continuity. The goal should be to achieve defence autonomy, rather than to build an army capable of confronting a major regional power on its own.
Such a strategy would rest on six pillars:
- Air and missile defence
- Early warning capabilities and information sovereignty
- Protection of critical infrastructure
- Air and naval power
- Cybersecurity and electronic warfare
- Restructuring security and military policy around the principle of multiple security guarantees rather than dependence on a single guarantor
Defence autonomy
Qatar does not need to exhaust its resources building the capabilities required to fight an all-out war alone against a major regional power, regardless of which power that might be. Such an ambition would be unrealistic for a country with limited territory and population.
A more realistic objective is to achieve a degree of defence autonomy appropriate for a small state such as Qatar. This means being able to perform a number of essential tasks without waiting for assistance from others.
These include, but are not limited to:
- Detecting threats and identifying their nature before they reach Qatari territory
- Delaying or absorbing an initial strike
- Protecting the country’s leadership and strategic centres
- Maintaining energy and water supplies, electricity, communications, ports and airports
- Keeping political and economic activities functioning during a crisis
- Imposing sufficiently high costs on an aggressor to force it to reconsider its calculations
- Withstanding a prolonged crisis without making the state’s continued functioning conditional on the arrival of external forces
To carry out these tasks effectively, the strategy should focus on the following priorities:
First: Building an integrated Qatari air defence shield
This is the most important gap that needs to be addressed. Possessing advanced fighter aircraft and air defence systems is not enough to make Qatar militarily autonomous. What is needed is an integrated national air and missile defence system.
The objective by 2031 should not be to possess the best defence system, but one that continues to function even in the absence of US forces or any other external security guarantor.
- A multilayered Qatari radar network
- Integration of civilian and military radar systems
- A unified national command and control centre
- Integration of short, medium and long-range air defences
- Expanded counter-drone capabilities
- Stronger electronic warfare capabilities and equipment
- Low-cost interception systems for small targets
- Enhanced mobile protection for radar installations and command centres
- Large national stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts
Second: An air force designed for independence
Qatar currently possesses an advanced air fleet. But the independence of an air force cannot be measured by the number of aircraft it operates. The crucial question is whether the Qatari air force can sustain operations for several consecutive weeks if external supply lines are disrupted.
For the answer to be yes, Qatar must develop the capacity to continue air operations even without direct US or other foreign support, albeit at a reduced level.
This requires policymakers and those responsible for developing the national defence strategy to focus on the following priorities over the next five years:
- Increasing ammunition stockpiles, whether through domestic production or imports
- Expanding domestic defence manufacturing capabilities and strengthening maintenance capacity
- Training more Qatari personnel to carry out a range of functions, including maintenance
- Building up dispersed ammunition stockpiles rather than concentrating them in a single location
- Increasing stocks of drones and other unmanned aircraft
- Developing ground and aerial refuelling capabilities and strengthening logistical support
Third: The sea as a second line of defence
For Qatar, a peninsula surrounded by water on three sides, protecting its maritime domain is not merely a military concern. It is also an economic necessity of the highest importance.
Liquefied natural gas, oil exports and imports all depend on the security of the surrounding waters. Qatar should therefore develop a naval force suited to its needs, equipped with advanced technology and capabilities.
The objective is not to build a large fleet, but to make attacks on Qatar’s maritime infrastructure both difficult and costly.
This requires a focus on several important priorities:
- Continuously improving and expanding maritime surveillance capabilities to protect Qatar’s waters and offshore installations
- Strengthening and developing capabilities to counter maritime drones
- Enhancing the protection of ports and securing shipping routes
Fourth: A national resilience programme
The most serious vulnerability of a country with limited territory and population lies in its infrastructure. A successful attack on a small number of critical facilities could have severe and far-reaching consequences for the entire country.
Given the importance of this threat, the national defence strategy should include the establishment of what might be called a “national resilience and protection programme”.
Such a programme would aim to protect critical infrastructure, including gas and energy facilities, water desalination plants, power stations, telecommunications centres and towers, civilian and military airports, ports and fuel networks, hospitals, government institutions and data centres.
One aspect of this protection is ensuring that every sector has adequate backup capacity. If a major desalination plant were to stop operating for any reason, for example, an alternativelem from escalating into a national crisis. The same principle should apply to every other sector
Fifth: Qatar must know what is happening around it before the US does
Military independence begins with information. Qatar therefore needs to develop its own national capabilities in the following areas:
- Space-based reconnaissance
- Unmanned aerial vehicles
- Radar systems
- Electronic intelligence
- Artificial intelligence-driven data analysis
This does not mean that Qatar needs to launch large satellites for every mission. Instead, it should work towards building an integrated system combining commercial and military satellites, international partnerships and national capabilities for collecting and analysing data.
The underlying principle is that Qatar should not depend on an external party to inform it of a threat approaching its territory.
Qatar will undoubtedly continue to need intelligence from the US, France, the United Kingdom and other countries. Nevertheless, it must possess the independent capacity to produce its own national intelligence picture, assess the nature of threats and determine how to prepare for them at an early stage, before requesting assistance from allies or partners.
Sixth: Diversifying security guarantees
The events of this year have demonstrated to all GCC states the importance of diversifying their alliances and security guarantees rather than relying on a single external power, particularly the US.
That power could become involved in future international crises, decide for one reason or another to limit its direct involvement in regional crises, or even reduce its military presence.
This makes it necessary to adopt a forward-looking approach based on diversifying alliances and making the security of the Gulf a matter of global interest requiring international cooperation.
In this context, GCC states could benefit from partnerships with South Korea, Turkiye and certain European powers, as well as regional powers such as Pakistan and China in specific fields, without hastily abandoning cooperation with the US.
The objective is to reduce the risks associated with dependence on a single supplier or ally. Such diversification does not mean building an alliance against the US.
Achieving defence and political autonomy for Qatar by 2031 does not mean isolating the country from its partners or dispensing with existing alliances. Rather, it means developing national capabilities that can ensure the protection of the state and its vital interests under all circumstances.
This strategic objective requires the development of an integrated air defence system, stronger intelligence and cyber capabilities, and better protection of critical infrastructure. It also requires improving the effectiveness of Qatar’s air and naval forces to ensure resilience and allow state institutions to continue functioning during a crisis.
Defence autonomy also requires diversifying international partnerships and establishing multiple security guarantees to reduce dependence on any single external power.
The foundation of this strategy is a transition from dependence on external protection towards the ability to deter threats, withstand crises and make independent national decisions at the appropriate time, while remaining open to international cooperation and partnerships.
A version of this piece in Arabic was originally
Source: www.aljazeera.com
