Can Ethiopia’s seven-group rebel alliance challenge Abiy Ahmed?

Two days after seven Ethiopian armed groups announced the formation of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival and pledged to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, a senior official of the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) was asked whether the statement amounted to a declaration of war.

He hesitated, then answered with a question of his own.

“We are at war now, aren’t we?”

He was speaking to Kjetil Tronvoll, professor of peace and conflict studies at Oslo New University College, who told Al Jazeera that the answer captured what the new rebel alliance had changed.

It has not created a single, coherent military force capable of marching on Addis Ababa. It has brought several of Ethiopia’s separate conflicts into the same political framework and, potentially, into the same military calculation.

The question now is how much further that can spread and whether seven movements with different enemies, territorial claims and histories can actually fight as one.

On Tuesday, drones struck two schools in Alamata, in southern Tigray, and the town’s mayor said 14 civilians were killed and 22 wounded. The account could not be independently verified, and the federal government did not immediately comment.

The alliance, whose founding statement Fano commander Zemene Kassie read on Tigrai TV on Sunday, brings together the Amhara Fano National Movement, the TPLF and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), along with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front, the Benishangul Peoples’ Liberation Movement and the Gumuz Peoples’ Democratic Movement.

It promises a transitional administration once Abiy is gone.

Abiy’s spokesperson, Billene Seyoum, told Reuters that the members had been collaborating for some time with Eritrean financial backing, an accusation Asmara has repeatedly denied.

The war that never really ended

The TPLF dominated Ethiopia for 27 years, until Abiy took power in 2018 and pushed it to the margins.

In November 2020, the federal army, backed by Eritrean troops and Amhara forces, went to war with it. The conflict became one of the deadliest in Ethiopia’s modern history. African Union mediator Olusegun Obasanjo believes that about 600,000 people died, though estimates of the toll have varied.

That war ended in November 2022 with an agreement signed in Pretoria, South Africa.

It was a permanent cessation of hostilities. It silenced the guns and set terms for Tigray’s disarmament, but left critical questions for later, above all Western Tigray, the fertile territory claimed by both sides and administered by Amhara forces since the war.

Only Addis Ababa and the TPLF signed. Neither Eritrea nor the Amhara forces had a seat.

Jawar Mohammed, the Oromo politician who was once an ally of Abiy and later spent time in prison, told Al Jazeera that shutting them out gave them every reason to wreck the deal.

The new alliance brings together forces that were excluded from the Pretoria negotiations with one of the agreement’s signatories.

The quiet it created ended in May, when the TPLF restored the legislative council that existed before the war and installed its chairman, Debretsion Gebremichael, as regional president, effectively setting up a rival political authority to the interim administration established under the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF accused the federal government of failing to honour its side of the deal.

Federal and Tigrayan forces then clashed at Shererina, near the Sudanese border, on August 1. Heavy artillery and drones were used in the fighting, and hundreds of Tigrayans, including wounded fighters, fled into Sudan.

Then came the drones.

On August 20, two drones struck homes in Mekelle, wounding 13 people, according to the TPLF. Al Jazeera could not independently verify the account.

On September 20, a drone destroyed a truck carrying 41 tonnes of food aid near Adi Daero, according to the TPLF. Addis Ababa has acknowledged none of the reported strikes.

“We signed the Pretoria Agreement, but the regime used the agreement to kill the people of Tigray systematically,” the TPLF’s spokesperson, Michael Asgedom, told Al Jazeera.

Two scripts

Asgedom tells it two ways.

The alliance “was created to bring peace and democracy to Ethiopia”, he said.

He also said it would build a new order “over the ruins of Abiy Ahmed’s system” and that this was “the right time to eradicate the regime”.

If war comes, he said, “it will be for survival.”

One script is for diplomats, the other for fighters.

Tronvoll calls it constructive ambiguity, a phrase that fits the alliance.

That the alliance claims to speak for seven peoples can delegitimise Abiy abroad and raise the price of any settlement, whether or not it fires a shot.

The first test is Eritrea, the neighbour whose name appears nowhere in the founding statement.

Over the past two years, Eritrea has reconciled with the TPLF, the enemy its troops helped to crush in 2020, as Abiy began demanding access to the Red Sea, which Asmara interpreted as a claim on its coast.

Jawar argues that Eritrea’s minimum aim is to keep any conflict on the Ethiopian side of the border.

The International Crisis Group has similarly assessed that Eritrea wants to establish a buffer zone on its southern border.

Asgedom has denied any Eritrean military presence in Tigray, but left the door ajar.

“If Eritrea can take action because of a potential danger to its survival, it is the Eritreans who should answer that question.”

Tronvoll says Eritrean troops are in Tigray now, a claim Al Jazeera could not independently verify. Magnus Taylor, deputy director of the International Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa project, told Al Jazeera that he was more cautious.

“This is substantially a domestic Ethiopian phenomenon,” he said.

Seven commands, one war?

The second test is whether seven commands can fight as one.

Zemene chairs the alliance, but the founding statement names no commander for a joint campaign.

If the line ever advances on Addis Ababa, Tronvoll asks, whose soldiers go first?

“If it is a Tigrayan general commanding Amharas to be sacrificed first to save the Tigrayan soldiers, that will split it immediately.”

Western Tigray is not mentioned in the statement either.

Taylor says the Fano are themselves divided over it: Commanders in Gojjam and Wollo can contemplate an alliance with Tigray, while those nearer the disputed land cannot.

“All these groups have their own different beef with the federal government,” Taylor said, and much of it dates from Abiy’s first year.

In 2018, Abiy invited exiled rebels home, and the OLA and the ONLF returned from Asmara.

But the OLA broke away to keep fighting, and talks with it in Tanzania collapsed in 2023.

The ONLF then split in 2025 after its then-chairman called for a return to armed struggle amid a dispute over a Chinese natural-gas concession in the Somali region.

The Amharan Fano rebelled against the government in 2023 after Abiy ordered the regional special forces to be folded into the federal army, a move many Amhara believed was tantamount to disarmament.

In June, Abiy’s Prosperity Party won 438 of 486 contested parliamentary seats. Voting did not take place in Tigray and was disrupted by insecurity in parts of Amhara and Oromia.

But their grievances are not only with Abiy’s government.

Referring to the news of the alliance, Jawar said he had “not seen anything as unpopular among the Oromos”, after years of accusations that Fano fighters have killed Oromo civilians in Wollega.

The OLA calls its participation a “procedural consensus” and has demanded that Fano disown a faction in Wollega that it says the government armed.

“There is no shared political objective,” Jawar said. “They don’t even have a shared tactical objective.”

And Tronvoll goes further: “If the members ever reached the palace, immediately a new war will start between them.”

The people being asked to fight

Then, there are the people being asked to fight.

Tigrayans are being mobilised alongside forces they remember from four years ago, when, in Tronvoll’s characterisation, “both the Eritreans and the Fano Amharas were perpetrating genocide on them.”

Friends in Tigray have told Tronvoll of coercive recruitment. He estimates that tens of thousands have left the region in advance of a possible war and the draft.

“People are voting with their feet,” he said. “They are on their knees already. So what are the alternatives for them than to fight?”

Beyond the border

Abiy, for now, appears unmoved.

“As long as they don’t threaten the palace at Arat Kilo, he can live with that,” Tronvoll said. “I don’t think he skips lunch because of this.”

Taylor struggles for a word.

“Is it a headache? Is it an irritant? Is it a blow? It’s a combination of those things.”

In his assessment, the TPLF, which lost most of its heavy weapons in 2022, has come off worse in recent clashes against federal air power. The likelier course, he says, is a slow deterioration, with southern Tigray the flashpoint.

Jawar views Abiy’s approach as containment: Keep flights into Tigray running so that those who want to leave can do so, and let a war that few want sour public opinion.

With Tigrayan forces having seized Mekelle’s airport, that exit has closed.

Tom Gardner, author of The Abiy Project, said, “For months Abiy’s strategy has been to maintain a low-level conflict largely conducted that strategy breaks down and a full-scale war erupts.”

The regional dimension is becoming harder to separate from the conflict inside Ethiopia.

The International Crisis Group says several thousand Tigrayans, mostly from Western Tigray/Welkait, have fought alongside the Sudanese army against the Rapid Support Forces.

Khartoum has also accused Addis Ababa of allowing drones to strike Sudan from Ethiopian soil, which Ethiopia denies.

Eritrea has aligned itself with Sudan’s army and established ties with Egypt, an opponent of Addis Ababa in the dispute surrounding Nile water resources.

The International Crisis Group has described Egypt as a close wartime ally of the Sudanese army.

Those alignments do not necessarily make the new Ethiopian alliance a regional military bloc. But they make it harder to treat Ethiopia’s conflicts as entirely domestic.

In Mekelle, the calculation is narrower.

“It is better to live than to die,” Asgedom said, “and the regime doesn’t allow us to live.”

A journalist in Mekelle, who spoke to Al Jazeera on condition of anonymity, said people had lived for months in a state of no-war-no-peace, and many now wanted it decided either way.

The alliance offers a path to war without making clear what that war would cost.

“We need peace,” residents told the journalist in Mekelle, after months without salaries or medicine.

In the city, there is an old belief that an unexpectedly windy and sunny day foretells fighting. Tuesday was both.

Source: www.aljazeera.com