Ethiopia’s new rebel alliance faces an old problem

The formation of a new armed alliance seeking to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed follows a pattern that has plagued Ethiopia – an empire of many nations and nationalities still in the making – for decades. Those in power leave little space for peaceful political struggle; the winner takes it all, so those who feel disadvantaged take up arms to change the status quo. Actors and alliances change over time, but violence remains the only constant.

The civil war in parts of Oromia has raged since Abiy took power in 2018, while the conflict in the Amhara region has raged since 2023. In Tigray, the Pretoria agreement was never fully implemented. Although large-scale war had not resumed, the region had been under siege since a faction of the TPLF took power and escalated its confrontation with the federal government. Until the latest escalation, Abiy’s government had largely been content to control the centre of power while confronting rebels with drones and ground forces.

The government held national elections despite voting not taking place in Tigray and several other districts. It formed the Ethiopian National Dialogue Commission in 2021, which concluded a national conference of about 4,000 participants in August, despite the absence of armed groups and other key opposition organisations. At the same time, the government has continued to pursue major development projects. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed was in Djibouti on September 24 for the launch of the Ethiopia-Djibouti petroleum infrastructure project. The newly elected parliament is due to open on October 5, when a new federal government will be constituted.

The Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, announced on September 20, was not a surprise. It followed several months of coordination meetings among the groups, held in the presence of military and security representatives from Eritrea and Sudan. It brings together the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), the Amhara Fano National Movement, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) and four movements from the Somali, Afar and Benishangul-Gumuz regions. Despite the OLA’s participation, Oromo organisations and elites are divided in their support for the alliance. The alliance aims to remove Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and establish an inclusive transition. Three of the seven organisations – the TPLF, the Amhara Fano National Movement and the Afar National Unity Revolutionary Front (ANURF) – have particular strategic importance. All three are in northern Ethiopia, which borders Eritrea, allowing continuous logistical support from there.

Three days later, TPLF forces, allied with the ANURF, advanced into several districts in Zone 2 with little resistance. ANURF is led by Ibrahim Osman Aliyu, known as Haji Ibrahim, a respected figure from Berhale in Zone 2 and a relative of Ethiopia’s defence minister, Aisha Mohammed. He defected to Eritrea last year with a contingent of Afar Special Forces and local forces. In a message to the Afar people, he assured them that the current fighting was directed against the Prosperity Party, not the Afar people or fighter groups, and that services and public transport would continue unhindered. He advised Afar residents to join his forces or stay away from the fighting. Their next target may be the vital highway linking Ethiopia to Djibouti.

We have seen part of this story before, though this time the alliance took longer to form. In November 2021, nine opposition groups hastily announced the United Front of Ethiopian Federalist and Confederalist Forces. Tigrayan forces and the OLA advanced towards Addis Ababa, while the alliance’s leaders spoke of dismantling Abiy’s government and installing a transitional authority. By January 2022, the Afar Revolutionary Democratic Unity Front had left the united front, accusing the TPLF of killing Afar civilians. In December of the same year, the Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement signed a peace deal with the regional government. The federal army counterattacked, Tigrayan forces withdrew from neighbouring regions and the TPLF eventually signed the 2022 Pretoria agreement with the government. That pact required the TPLF to stop supporting armed groups elsewhere in Ethiopia.

The same pattern could repeat itself. The lesson is not that 2026 will mirror 2021 exactly. The new alliance includes Fano, whose fighters stood with the federal government against the TPLF during the earlier war and now fight Abiy. The government is also fighting on several fronts. But the precedent shows how quickly a common enemy can stop being enough when battlefield fortunes change.

Both Fano and the TPLF claim western Tigray, or what the Amhara call Wolgait-Tsegede. The founding statement offers no settlement. A Tigrayan leadership that abandons its claim risks alienating people displaced from their homes; a Fano leadership that concedes it risks losing the support of fighters for whom the territory is central. Calling the issue a matter for later negotiations buys time but does not create a compromise. The same problem reaches beyond the north: Oromo, Amhara and Somali movements do not share one vision of Ethiopia’s federal order, boundaries or distribution of power.

Nor does each organisation speak for everyone in the population it claims to represent. Tigray’s leaders are divided over their relationship with Addis Ababa and the Pretoria settlement. Fano is a collection of regional commands with different priorities. Even the Ogaden National Liberation Front’s participation has exposed an internal dispute: An overseas faction supports the alliance, while leaders inside Ethiopia’s Somali region deny joining it. A seven-signature declaration cannot settle these questions of mandate.

Then there is the military problem. These forces operate across distant regions and can stretch the federal army, forcing Addis Ababa to defend multiple theatres. But simultaneous fighting is not the same as a single campaign. A successful march on the capital would require reliable supply routes, coordinated command and political support in the areas through which fighters must pass. Government drones make concentrated formations and exposed supply lines more vulnerable. Air power alone cannot govern contested towns, but neither can an alliance govern them simply by capturing them.

Eritrea adds another risk. Addis Ababa accuses Asmara of backing the alliance; Eritrea has repeatedly denied similar allegations, though ample evidence suggests otherwise. Relations between the two countries have deteriorated sharply amid Ethiopian calls for Red Sea access and disputes left unresolved after the Tigray war. Outside support could strengthen individual factions, but dependence on Eritrea could also make them unacceptable to other Ethiopians. If the Ethiopian government comes to see Eritrea as a direct threat, it may attack, with unpredictable consequences and the risk of drawing in other regional powers. If Abiy’s government itself comes under serious threat, the UAE may become fully involved to rescue one of its closest regional allies.

Three paths now seem possible. The most likely is prolonged, uneven conflict: Local offensives and temporary bargains weaken the government’s reach without dislodging it from Addis Ababa. A second is alliance fragmentation. If western Tigray, Afar or another disputed territory becomes the price of cooperation, some partners may leave or make separate deals. A renegotiation of the Pretoria agreement and concessions from Abiy to Tigray could also take the TPLF out of the alliance, as happened to the ambitions of the 2021 front. A less likely but far more dangerous possibility is a cascade of federal military defections and coordinated rebel advances. Even then, a rebel takeover would constitute an unconstitutional change of government under African Union rules and face regional opposition. Removing Abiy would settle none of the arguments over land, command and constitutional power. Victory could open another civil war.

Ethiopia has repeatedly watched coalitions of convenience promise a new beginning through force. What matters now is not whether an armed alliance or a government survives, but what happens to the people who will have to live with what both do next.

The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.

Source: www.aljazeera.com