Bamako, Mali – In Bamako, a fuel blockade has exposed the vulnerability of supply routes into the capital. In the north, separatist and armed groups have increasingly coordinated against the state, while the government faces questions over how much territory it can effectively control.
On September 10, less than two weeks before Mali’s independence anniversary, the Al Qaeda-affiliated armed group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen (JNIM) attacked an army camp in Dioura in central Mali.
The attack followed an April offensive in which JNIM and the Tuareg-led Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), which seeks greater autonomy or independence for northern Mali, coordinated attacks on military and strategic sites in Bamako, Kati, Mopti, Gao and Kidal.
Defence Minister Sadio Camara was killed in the attacks, which exposed the vulnerability of government forces in several parts of the country.
The April offensive followed months of pressure on the capital’s supply lines. Since September 2025, JNIM has targeted fuel tankers and highways carrying fuel from Senegal and Ivory Coast, causing severe shortages in Bamako and disrupting electricity supplies and schooling.
On September 14, more than 900 fuel tankers entered Bamako under military escort, according to the Malian government. But the need to protect such a major operation illustrates the vulnerability of the routes connecting Bamako to its neighbours.
The government seized power in a coup in 2020, promising to restore security. The disruption of vital supply routes, however, has highlighted the difficulty of protecting access to the capital across a vast country.
A widening armed-group coalition
Northern Mali has long been at the centre of Tuareg demands for greater autonomy or independence. What has changed is the degree of coordination between JNIM and the FLA in confronting the government, despite their different long-term objectives.
Beverly Ochieng, senior analyst at Control Risks, told Al Jazeera that the relationship presents a challenge to the military government’s effort to consolidate control over the country’s territory.
“The alliance between JNIM and FLA poses a threat to the government’s consolidation of national territory, which is a key goal of the military. Periodic confrontations between the JNIM-FLA coalition and government forces will continue to undermine a political settlement to the violence,” she said.
Ochieng warned that both sides could harden their positions.
“There is a risk of hardline stances both by the military government and armed groups that will pose a challenge in re-establishing a peace deal between the two sides,” she said.
She said Mali was likely to continue receiving diplomatic and security support from Algeria, its Alliance of Sahel States (AES) partners (Burkina Faso and Niger), and even Senegal and Togo, representing the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). She said that support could delay a deeper security crisis.
The April offensive showed the extent of that coordination, despite the groups’ different objectives. JNIM seeks to impose its interpretation of Islamic law, while the FLA is rooted in Tuareg separatist demands for autonomy and independence.
The two groups have cooperated before, including in 2012 and 2024, but their alliances have broken down over territorial and ideological differences.
Sovereignty rhetoric outpaces control on the ground
Mali has turned away from former regional and international partners and built new alliances around greater national sovereignty.
Mali’s government has framed its withdrawal from these institutions as an assertion of sovereignty. But Abubakar Abubakar Usman, a senior lecturer in international and strategic studies at the University of Malaysia, said Mali’s growing reliance on Russia complicates that argument.
“Mali’s exit from these institutions therefore looks less like an assertion of independence and more like a switching of alliances, from a Western-aligned security order to a Russian-aligned one,” Usman said.
Mali’s withdrawal from ECOWAS alongside Burkina Faso and Niger took effect in January 2025. Human Rights Watch said the withdrawal raised concerns over victims’ access to the ECOWAS Court in cases involving alleged rights abuses.
The three countries have instead strengthened the AES, while Mali has deepened its military relationship with Russia. The Wagner Group’s paramilitary role has been taken over by Russia’s Africa Corps, which operates under the Russian defence ministry.
But the security situation has continued to deteriorate.
The April offensive reached sites near the capital and pushed Russian and Malian forces out of positions in the north. The September attack in Dioura showed that armed groups can still inflict heavy losses on government forces.
In September 2025, Mali announced its withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC), alongside Burkina Faso and Niger. Mali’s formal withdrawal began in June and will take a year. The ICC says withdrawal does not remove obligations while a country remains a member or affect matters already under consideration.
Rights groups have also documented abuses by armed groups, Malian forces and allied Russian fighters. Human Rights Watch said in June that civilians had suffered serious abuses by multiple sides since fighting intensified in April.
The security challenge also extends beyond Mali’s borders.
The AES has established a joint security framework, but each member is facing its own armed conflicts. In Niger, JNIM and Islamic State-linked fighters are competing and fighting, while violence has also placed pressure on neighbouring Benin and Togo.
What independence looks like from Bamako
UNHCR estimated that more than 400,000 people were internally displaced in Mali in June. Gao, Mopti, Menaka and Timbuktu are among the regions hosting significant displaced populations, while the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has identified large displacement sites and continued arrivals in Mopti.
Farming and herding communities are dealing with insecurity, competition over resources and disrupted services. Limited state institutions and the presence of armed groups and local conflicts further complicate the government’s authority.
The government has restored fuel supplies to Bamako, but armed groups can still disrupt key routes and attack military positions.
For residents of the capital, the anniversary arrives with unease.
One Malian resident, who asked not to be identified for safety reasons, described a gap between the government’s language and the reality faced by people on the ground.
“We want to celebrate Independence Day, but there is a lot of anxiety this year. The attacks on the army camp in Dioura have reminded everyone that the security situation is still very fragile,” the resident said.
“We hear the government saying that the army is carrying out operations and that the situation is under control, but people are asking themselves what ‘under control’ really means, especially when armed groups can still carry out attacks of this scale.
“We want to believe that things are improving, but after everything that has happened recently, there is still a lot of uncertainty about where the country is heading.”
Source: www.aljazeera.com
